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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TIMOTHY LEONARD WOOD,
individually, and TIMOTHY
LEONARD WOOD, as guardian
ad Jitem for TIMOTHY
JOHNATHAN WOOD, a minor,
Appellant,

Case No. 19336

vs.
WINSTON STRATTON and TRACY
STRATTON,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for wrongful death arising from a
single-car accident in Washington County, Utah.

Plaintiff

Timothy Leonard Wood is the father of Timothy Johnathan Wood,
deceased, who died as a result of injuries sustained while
riding as a passenger in a vehicle operated by respondent
Tracy Stratton and owned by respondent Winston Stratton.

The

parties will be designated as they appeared below.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted the defendants' joint Motion for
oummary Judgment.

Judgment was entered in favor of defendants

and against the plaintiff on June 16, 1983.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants ask this Court to affirm the judgment of the
lower court.
QUESTION ON APPEAL
Has the plaintiff established, upon the record before
this Court, that he presented to the lower court a timely and
specific showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants were guilty of willful
misconduct which proximately caused the death of plaintiff's
decedent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the reasons stated in Point I of the Argument which
follows, the only facts discernible from the record on appeal
concern the procedural disposition of this case in the lower
court.
The single-vehicle accident underlying this action occurred on or about April 23, 1982.

[R. l].

Complaint was filed on August 6, 1982.

The plaintiff's
[R. l].

The defen-

dants' Answer, raising inter alia the defense of the Utah
Guest Statute, Utah Code Ann. §41-9-1

~-

(1953), was

filed with the lower court on September 23, 1982.
Following extensive discovery, including the taking of
five depositions, the defendants filed a joint Motion for
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s 11 mmary JudgmPnt and Motion to Publish with a supporting
Memorandum of Points and Authorities on May 26, 1983.
9-17, 16-19].

(R.

The motion and memorandum were served upon

counsel for plaintiff one day earlier, on May 25, 1983.

(R.

11, 20 l .
under the calendaring procedures of the lower court, the
defendants' motions came on for decision before the Honorable
J. Harlan Burns on June 7, 1983.

1

Judge Burns continued

the matter to the following day, June 8.

[R. 21].

On June

B, Judge Burns took the matter under advisement for ruling;
the plaintiff's time for responding to defendants' motions
had run without plaintiff having filed any counter-affidavits
or materials in opposition to defendants' motions.

[R. 22].

The lower court subsequently granted defendants' motions
and a proposed form of judgment was mailed by defense counsel
to the court and counsel for plaintiff on June 9, 1983, pursuant to Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the District
Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah.

[R.

36-38;

The procedure of the Fifth Judicial District Court
is to call up all motions on the court calendar for review
and decision at the expiration of the ten day period allowed
by Rule 2.8, Rules of Practice in the District Courts of the
State of Utah, for filing a response to the motion.
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Appendix, p. l].

No objection to the proposed form of judg-

ment was filed by plaintiff.

The lower court signed and

entered the Summary Judgment on June 16, 1983.

[R. 36-37]

Following receipt of notification of the lower court's
decision, counsel for plaintiff belatedly filed a number of
materials in opposition to defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, including so-called "abstracts" of depositions.
(R. 24-28].

At no time has counsel for plaintiff denied

receipt of defendants' motion and memorandum or the proposed
judgment.
The plaintiff's Notice of Appeal was filed July 15,
1983.

[R. 63].
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO CARRY HIS BURDEN OF
SHOWING UPON THE RECORD ON APPEAL THAT THE
LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

An appellant has the affirmative burden of showing, upon
the record on appeal, how the lower court erred with respect
to the order or judgment upon which the appeal is based.
Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499, 500 (Utah 1976);
Hamid v. Sew Original, 645 P.2d 496, 497

~

(Okla. 1982) [Legal

error is not presumed from a silent record].

Under Utah la»

the judgment of the lower court is presumed correct until
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this affirmative burden has been met.

Tucker Realty, Inc. v.

Nunlev, 16 Utah 2d 97, 396 P.2d 410, 412-13 (1964).
An appellant's showing of error must be made solely upon
the record before the reviewing court.

This Court has con-

sistently followed the well-recognized rule of appellate
review that matters not a part of the record before the
reoiewing court need not, and indeed cannot, be considered in
connection with the appeal.

Ockerman v. Lincoln National

Life Insurance Company, 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978); In re
Estate of Cluff, 587 P.2d 128, n. 1 (Utah 1978).

This rule

was most recently reaffirmed by this Court's opinion in
Robinson & Wells, P.C. v.
July 28, 1983).

Warren, No. 18413 (Slip Opinion,

Justice Oaks, for a unanimous court, wrote:

Plaintiff does not contest these propositions,
but maintains that the reasonableness of its fees is
not before us on this appeal. In arguing this
point, both parties encumber their briefs with
assertions of facts about what went on in the
hearing before the arbitrator for which there is no
reference to the record and no support in the
record. We ignore all such matters and base our
decision solely upon the facts shown in the record.
· No. 18 413, at p. 2.
Where only a partial record is presented to the reviewing
court, it is presumed that the remaining record below supports the judgment of the trial court.
~Nunley,

Tucker Realty, Inc.

16 Utah 2d 97, 396 P.2d 410, 413 (1964); Bennett
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Leasing Company v. Ellison, 15 Utah 2d 72, 387 P.2d 246, 247
(1963).
Utah law charges the appellant with the responsibility
and burden of bringing before the reviewing court a record
upon which the merit of his position can be ascertained.
Bennett Leasing Company v. Ellison, supra.

In the absence of

an appellate record sufficient to document the alleged trial
court error, the judgment of the lower court is presumed
valid and must be sustained.
In Richards v. Anderson, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P.2d 59
(1959), this court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claim for damages arising
from an intersection collision.

The Court wrote:

When a summary judgment is granted against a
party, he is entitled to have the trial court, and
this court on review, consider all of the evidence
and every inference fairly to be derived therefrom
in the light most favorable to him.
This rule,
relied upon by the plaintiff, is not very helpful
here because the only facts before us are contained
in the above-mentioned documents and the recitals in
the judgment signed by the trial court based upon
the pretrial conference.
In the absence of any
other record it stands unassailed as reflecting the
facts presented to the court.
If the plaintiff contends to the contrary, he has the burden of bringing
the record here to show otherwise, because the burden is upon the appellant to show error.
337 P.2d at 60 [Footnotes omitted].
Similarly, in Joseph, M.D. v. Markovitz, M.D., 551 P.2d
571 (Ariz. App. 1976), the appellate court was called upon~
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1 Pvi~w a summary judgment granted by the trial court in favor

of the defendants.

In affirming the judgment, the Arizona

court of Appeals followed the same rationale relied upon by
the Utah court:
We recognize that a summary judgment must be
viewed in a light most favorable to the party
against whom it was directed and that it is inappropriate if there is any doubt as to whether an issue
of material fact exists. • • • However, when a
motion for summary judgment is supported by proof of
specific facts which would defeat plaintiff's claim,
plaintiff must then come foward to show the existence of a genuine factual issue.
On appeal, an appellant must be able to point
to an issue of fact in the record which renders the
summary judgment improper. • • •
The record here
is void of any evidence [supporting plaintiff's
allegations].
551 P.2d at 574 [Citations omitted].
In his brief, plaintiff relies upon four depositions
taken by these defendants below for the proposition that
there exists a material question of fact as to whether the
defendants were guilty of willful misconduct in causing the
accident.

[Brief of Appellant, pp. 2-6].

Despite his

alieqed reliance on these depositions, plaintiff failed to
nesignate them as a part of the record on appeal.
65-66).

[R.

Plaintiff's belated attempt to supplement the record

on appeal to include these depositions is not only untimely
but ineffective.

At this juncture of the proceedings, the

record on appeal may only be modified by stipulation of the
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parties or court order.
Procedure;

Tuc~er

P.2d 410,413

Rule 75(h), Utah Rules of Civil

Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 16 Utah 2d 97,

(1964).

1q~

Plaintiff has never obtained an appro-

priate order and, therefore, the depositions are not a part
of the record before this Court.
Since the evidence relied upon by the appellant for his
showing of error by the lower court is not a proper part of
the record on appeal, Utah case law dictates that the judgment granted these defendants by the trial court be presumed
correct, that the record below be presumed to support the
trial court's ruling, and that the judgment of the trial
court be affirmed.
POINT II.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS PROPER,
GIVEN PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO MAKE A SPECIFIC SHOWING TO THE LOWER COURT OF AN
ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS.
Summary judgment is the appropriate remedy to avoid the
time, effort and expense of trial, for both the parties and
court, where the pleadings, depositions and admissions on
file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine dispute regarding any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Company v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975).
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Holbrook

Plaintiff contends on appeal that the lower court erred
j;,

granting defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment for three

rt:asons:

(1)

the motion was premature given the posture of

the case [Brief of Appellant, p. 13]:

(2)

the motion was

defective because it was not supported by affidavits [Brief
of Appellant, pp. 5-7]: and

(3)

the case record before the

lower court contained material questions of fact on the issue
of defendants' willful misconduct [Brief of Appellant, p. 7].
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, governs the timing and procedure for summary judgment motions.

Rule 56(a)

prov ides:
A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration
of twenty days from the commencement of the action
or after service of a motion for summary judgment by
the adverse party, move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon
all or any part thereof.
[Emphasis added].
The underscored language refutes plaintiff's first two allegations of error.
A.

The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was
Timely.

The defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was not filed
until the plaintiff's Complaint had been on file for over
nine months, a much longer time period than the twenty days
reguired by Rule 56(a).

The motion was therefore timely

filed.
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The plaintiff impliedly argues that the defendants'
motion was also premature because the plaintiff still contemplated doing additional discovery.
pp. 12-13].

[Brief of Appellant,

Plaintiff's desire to pursue further discovery

is not a sufficient ground for denying defendants' motion.
Only when an adverse party indicates to the court that he is
unable to respond to a motion for summary judgment because of
a lack of discovery need further discovery be allowed prior
to the trial court ruling on the motion.

Strand v. Assoc.

Students of the Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 193-94 (Utah
1977).

If that is the case, the proper procedure is for the

adverse party to file with the court an affidavit setting out
the reasons why he needs further discovery to oppose the
motion.

Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

No affi-

davit was filed by counsel for plaintiff in this case.

Even

where a proper affidavit is filed, it is not an abuse of the
court's discretion to deny the party's request for further
time to do discovery where the party has had ample time to
initiate discovery but has done little or nothing.

~

v. City of Green River, 642 P.2d 443, 444, n. 2 (Wyo. 1982)
[Plaintiff did not pursue discovery during three months
between filing of complaint and defendants' motions for summary judgment].

Plaintiff had ample opportunity to depose

defendants or whomever he wished prior to the filing of
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defendants' motion, or to file an affidavit telling the trial
'~"urt

why additional time was needed.

B.

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was Properly
Supported.

The language of Rule 56 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically recognizes that a party may move for
summary judgment with or without supporting affidavits.
Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, summary judgment may still

be appropriate where the moving party relies, as in this
case, upon depositions and not affidavits in support of his
motion.

Clegg v. Lee, 30 Utah 2d 242, 516 P.2d 348, 352

(1973)

[Citing United American Life Ins. Co. v. Willey, 21

Utah 2d 279, 444 P.2d 755

c.

(1968)].

Plaintiff did not Present Timely Opposition to
Defendants' Motion in the Lower Court.

Once a defendant files a motion for summary judgment with
supporting evidence challenging the allegations of the complaint, a plaintiff may not rest on his pleading but must
respond and set forth specific facts which show that there is
a genuine issue for trial.

Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934,

g39 (Utah 1979); Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

If he fails to so respond, judgment may be entered against
him.

Id.
The practice of the lower court with respect to motions

for summary judgment is governed not only by Rule 56, Utah
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Rules of Civil Procedure, but by Rule 2.8, Rules of Practice
in the District Courts and Circuit Courts of the State of
Utah.

Rule 2.8 provides:

(a)
All motions, except in uncontested or
ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a statement of points and authorities and any affidavits
relied upon in support thereof.
(b)
The responding party shall file and serve
upon all parties within ten (10) days after service
of the motion, a statement of answering points and
authorities and counter affidavits.
(c)
The moving party may serve and file reply
points and authorities within five (5) days after
service of responding party's points and authorities. Upon the expiration of such five (5) day
period to file reply points and authorities, either
party may notify the clerk to submit the matter for
decision.
(d)
Decision shall be rendered without oral
argument unless oral argument is requested by the
court, in which event the clerk shall set a date and
time for argument.
(e)
In all cases where the granting of a
motion whould dispose of the action on the merits,
with prejudice, the party resisting the motion may
request oral argument, and such request shall be
granted unless the motion has been summarily
denied.
If no such request is made, oral argument
shall be deemed to have been waived.
(f)
Provided, however, that any District Court
and any Circuit Court by order of the Judge or
Judges of the court may exclude that court from the
operation of this rule 2.8 in which case an alternative procedure shall be prescribed by written
administrative order or rule.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to
Publish, along with the required supporting Memorandum of
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points and Authorities, was served upon counsel for plaintiff
by mail on May 25, 1983.
of these documents.

Plaintiff has never denied receipt

Allowing time for mailing, plaintiff's

response to the motion and any request for oral argument were
due on or before June 7, 1983.

Judge Burns calculated the

same timetable and placed the matter on his calendar for that
day.

Judge Burns called the matter on June 7.

had been filed.

No response

Judge Burns then continued the matter to the

following day's calendar, by which time any written response
would have to have been filed.

Plaintiff did not appear on

June 8 and no opposing memorandum or counter-affidavits were
on file.

Judge Burns then took the matter under advisement.

The following day, June 9, 1983, defense counsel was
notified that their Motion for Summary Judgment was granted.
A form of judgment was prepared and mailed to Judge Burns and
plaintiff's counsel that same day.

Counsel for plaintiff

claims he did not know the motion had been granted, although
he has never denied receipt of the proposed form of Judgment
with transmittal letter.

[Brief of Appellant, p. 12).

Despite this denial, it seems more than a coincidence that
plaintiff submitted deposition abstracts, memoranda, notices
of deposition, and other materials in opposition to defendants' motion just after he received the summary judgment and
transmittal letter.
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Plaintiff argues in his brief that, even though he fai]ef
to file timely opposition to defendants' motion, Judge Burns
erred in granting the motion because a question of material
fact concerning the issue of defendants' willful misconduct
can be found in the deposition testimony available for review
by the lower court.

Even assuming arguendo that

(1) a ques-

tion of fact exists upon the deposition testimony, and (2)
the depositions are part of the appellate record, plaintiff
has still not shown that the lower court erred in granting
defendants' motion.

The plaintiff, not the trial court, has

the responsibility to search the record below and set out,

~

timely opposition, the facts which show a material issue for
trial which precludes summary judgment.

A trial court's

crowded calendar does not permit it to do the lawyer's work
as well as its own, searching hundreds of pages of deposition
testimony for evidence to support a plaintiff's case prior to
ruling.

Plaintiff's argued position not only reads Rule

56(e) out of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but rewards
indolence rather than diligence.
POINT III.
UNDER PRESENT UTAH LAW, THE JUDGMENT OF THE
LOWER COURT WAS PROPER UPON ANY VIEW OF THE
RECORD.
These defendants contend, as argued in the foregoing
points, that the plaintiff has waived his right to rely upon
-14-

the deposition testimony taken below to contest the lower
court's ruling because:

(1) the depositions are not properly

a part of the record on appeal: and (2) the plaintiff did not
rely upon the depositions to formulate a timely opposition to
defendants' motion in the lower court.

While reasserting

this position, defendants feel it is appropriate, given the
plaintiff's reference in his brief to selected parts of the
deposition testimony, to refer to the depositions to show the
court that Judge Burns' decision is proper and should be
affirmed upon any state of the record.

The Statement of

Facts with accompanying deposition references set forth in
plaintiff's brief is incomplete and, as to several matters,
inaccurate and misleading.

The following is offered to sup-

plement and correct the plaintiff's recitation of the facts.
The accident occurred on Friday, April 23, 1982.

At the

time of the accident, defendant Tracy Stratton and Timothy
Johnathan wood were students at Hurricane High School.
two boys were good friends.

The

They lifted weights together and

belonged to a close circle of friends which included Donette
Gubler, Diane Gubler, Gail Ruesch, Hein Ha and Paul Keene.
[Deposition of Paul Keene, taken October 18, 1982, pp. 6-7
(hereinafter "Keene"): deposition of Donette Gubler, taken
Oclober 18, 1982, pp. 7, 9, 11 (hereinafter "Gubler"):
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deposition of Gail Ruesch, taken October 18, 1982, pp. 5-6, R
(hereinafter "Ruesch")].
The day of the accident, Friday, was a slow day at the
high school; most of the students were away at a track meet
and there was little going on.

[Keene, pp. 9-10].

As Tracy

Stratton returned from eating lunch at home, Diane Gubler
asked him to give her, Donette and Gail a ride in his
father's Bronco.

Tracy obliged and the group took a short

drive down Main Street in Hurricane.
Ruesch, pp. 10-13].

[Gubler, pp. 24-27;

When they returned to the school, Tracy

parked the vehicle and got out to talk to Tim Wood, Paul
Keene, Hein Ha and some other boys standing nearby; the girls
remained in the Bronco listening to music.

[Gubler, p. 29].

The group was bored and so decided to go for a ride.
pp. 9-10; Gubler, p. 30; Ruesch, p. 11].

[Keene,

Tracy, Tim, Paul

and Hein got in the Bronco with the girls and the group of
seven teenagers left the high school headed out nearby "airport road."

Tracy was driving and Tim was seated in the rear

on the passenger side next to his girlfriend, Gail Ruesch.
[Ruesch, p. 18].
Airport road is a common place for Hurricane teenagers
and other local residents to go for a drive.
14].

[Keene, p.

The road runs to the airport through an open, rural

area outside the city limits.

Out past the airport is an
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area known as the "boneyard" where animal carcasses are discarded.

[Keene, pp. 9-10].

Many students drive around the

dirt roads in the area and it is a popular hunting place.
The "boneyard" is also the home of a local legend, the "devil
worshipers," and is reputed to be a "scary" place.

[Gubler,

pp. 22-23, 74; Ruesch, pp. 31-32].
Some distance along the road, out past the city limits,
is a gentle S-shaped curve.

[Gubler, Ex. l].

In the middle

of the curve lies a depression in the asphalt roadway caused
by water runoff and soil erosion.

deep on the left side

The depression is 2-3 feet

(as one drives towards the airport) and

tapers off towards the right.

[Gubler, pp. 41, 53-54].

The

depression or "bump" had been in the roadway sometime prior
to April 23, 1982, and both students and community residents
have been known to "bounce" their cars a little as they went
through it.

[Gubler, pp. 20-21, 48, 73; Deposition of Hein

Ha, taken October 18, 1982, pp. 15, 20 (hereinafter "Ha")].
There were several such depressions along this road, some
worse than the one involved in the accident.
73].

[Gubler, p.

All of the passengers in the Bronco, with the exception

of Donette Gubler and Gail Ruesch, were familiar with the
road and had been through the bump prior to April 23, 1982.
[Keene, p. 12; Ha, p. 13; Gubler, pp. 20-21; Ruesch, p. 19].
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The accident occurred as Tracy Stratton drove the Bronr,,
through the bump in the curve.

The weight of the fully

loaded vehicle and its speed caused it to bounce as it came
out of the depression and the vehicle slid into gravel on the
shoulder of the road.

Tracy tried to regain control of the

vehicle and successfully pulled it back onto the road surface, but the vehicle then skidded again and rolled over,
finally stopping some distance from the curve.

Tracy was not

intoxicated at the time, and none of the passengers had paid
him for the ride.

[Keene, p. 25: Gubler, p. 38).

The depositions do not support several assertions made in
plaintiff's Statement of Facts.

Contrary to plaintiff's rep-

resentation, Donette Gubler's deposition testimony does not
actually establish a speed estimate of 60-65 miles per hour.
[Brief of Appellant, p. 4).

Q.
When you testified with respect to a speed
estimate of 60 to 65, that is just a guess isn't it?
A.
Yes.
It's from what other people say,
because personally, myself I really don't know.

Q.
You have no idea whatsoever of what his
speed was just prior to the time he hit the dip?
A.
Right.
So it doesn't give me the right to
say how fast.
I don't know.

Q.
In fact, from the time you crossed the bridge
up until the moment that you crashed, you really have no
recollection of your own whatsoever, do you?
A.
No, I don't.
p. 77, 11. 1-4).

[Gubler, p. 76, 11. 18-25,
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Plaintiff correctly states Gail Ruesch's claim that she
asked to be let out of the Bronco as they approached the
bump.

[Brief of Appellant, p. 4].

However, plaintiff omits

Tim Wood's calm response to his girlfriend's alleged hysterics.
Only Tim heard that, I think.
Donette said she
heard something about that too. And he goes, It's
okay.

Q.

Who said, It's okay?

A.
Tim said, It's okay.
It's okay.
Then we
hit the bump, and everybody was laughing, like •

•• •
Q.
Did he say it in an excited manner, or did
he say it to calm you down, or what was the tone of
his voice.

A.

Like, It's okay.

Q.

It was a no-big-deal "It's okay"?

A.

Yes.

Now what does that mean?

[Ruesch, p. 24, 11. 20-24, p. 26, 11. 11-15].
Most importantly, there is no evidence, nor any permissi, ble inference from the evidence, that Tracy Stratton intended
to frighten anyone, least of all Tim wood, by trying to get
his vehicle airborne through the dip.
his brief:
involved,

Plaintiff states in

"There is some evidence that the young men
including the driver, intended to frighten the

girls and made plans to do so shortly prior to entering the
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Bronco vehicle for the drive which resulted in the injuries
and death complained of."

[Brief of Appellant, p. 5].

The

testimony cited in support of this statement says nothing
more than that the football players at Hurricane High School
had talked during the preceding week about scaring new cheetleaders by taking them out to the "boneyard" at night to
visit the "devil worshippers."

[Ha, p. 16-17].

That hardly

equates with a plan conceived by Tracy, Tim, Hein and Paul,
just before the accident to frighten these particular girls
by flying the Bronco through the dip in the airport road.
Plaintiff's stretch to prove an intent to harm on Tracy's
part is, however, understandable.

As will be shown, without

such proof plaintiff's claim fails as a matter of law under
the Utah Guest Statute and its supporting case law.
The Utah Guest Statute, Utah Code Ann. §41-9-1

~·

(1953), bars any right of recovery against the driver or
owner of a motor vehicle for the death or injury of a nonpaying passenger, unless the claimant can establish the
driver was intoxicated or guilty of willful misconduct and
that such was the proximate cause of the injury or death.
The guest statute has been repeatedly upheld as constitutional by both the Utah and United States
Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883

Supre~e

Courts.

(Utah 1974), cert. den. 419

U.S. 810, reh. den. 419 U.S. 1060.
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It is undisputed that

Timothy Johnathan Wood was a "guest" in the Stratton vehicle
at the time of the accident and that Tracy Stratton was not
intoxicated.

Therefore, unless the plaintiffs can establish

that Tracy Stratton was guilty of "willful misconduct" the
defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Utah Guest Statute is the established law of this
state and any exceptions to its general application are to be
narrowly construed.

Utah Code Ann. §68-3-2 (1953).

Con-

sistent with this policy, the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted the "willful misconduct" exception of the Guest
Statute as having a very limited application.

The standard

for determining what acts constitute "willful misconduct" was
set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Stack v. Kearnes, 221
P.2d 594
since.

(Utah 1950), and has been consistently followed
In that case the court approved instructions defining

"willful misconduct" as:
[T]he intentional doing of an act or intentional
failing to do an act, with knowledge that serious
injury is a probable and not merely possible result,
or the intentional doing of an act with wanton and
reckless disregard of the possible consequences. It
involves deliberate intentional or wanton conduct in
doing or omitting to do an act with knowledge or
appreciation that injury is likely to result therefrom.

2?1 P.2d at 597.
The stated test requires that the act be intentional and
done with actual knowledge that the probable result will be
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serious injury.

Gross negligence will not suffice, nor will

even a "rash inadvertence to consequences."

State v.

Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208, 357 P.2d 183, 187

(1960).

The application of this strict standard is best demonstrated by Mukasey v. Aaron, 20 Utah 2d 383, 438 P.2d 702
(1968), a case which closely parallels the case at hand.

In

Mukasey, the plaintiff-passenger was injured when the car in
which he was riding failed to negotiate a curve and overturned.

Weather conditions and visibility were good.

The

plaintiff claimed that the defendant-driver was guilty of
willful misconduct in approaching the curve at 50 miles per
hour without maintaining a proper lookout and in failing to
observe that the curve could not be negotiated at that rate
of speed.

483 P.2d at 703.

The Supreme Court affirmed the

summary judgment granted the defendant by the lower court,
agreeing that the evidence demonstrated nothing more than
simple negligence and that there was no issue of willful misconduct for the jury.

438 P.2d at 704.

Similarly, there is no evidence in this case which would
support a finding of willful misconduct against Tracy
Stratton under the standards enunciated by the Utah Supreme
Court.

Nothing in the record suggests that Tracy was even

aware that driving through the depression with a loaded
vehicle might result in serious injury to his passengers; he
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had bPPn along that part of the road before and through the
bump without accident or injury.

He certainly did not intend

or wish to harm anyone, least of all these close school
friends.

At most, he is guilty of a mistake of judgment in

failing to realize that the added weight of his additional
passengers would cause a problem while going through the
depression.

This oversight, although regrettable, certainly

does not rise above the level of simple negligence. 2
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff has not met his affirmative burden of
demonstrating, upon the record properly before this Court,
that the lower court erred in granting judgment in favor of
these defendants.

Indeed, plaintiff did not even attempt to

make a timely showing to the lower court of a remaining issue
of material fact which would preclude summary judgment for
the defendants.

Justice is not served by allowing the plain-

2 The plaintiff's reliance upon Stack v. Kearnes,
supra, to suggest otherwise is misplaced.
The defendant's
rnnduct in that case included a late-night, high-speed race
•hrough a residential section of Salt Lake City, •stuntdr ivi ng", and "laughing off" repeated requests from his
passengers to slow his speed, choosing instead to "pour it
on". 221 P.2d at 596-97.
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tiff to repeatedly ignore the procedural rules establishPrl b;
this Court to the prejudice of the defendants.
For the foregoing reasons, respondents Winston Stratton
and Tracy Stratton requestfully urge this Court to affirm the
judgment of the lower court.
DATED this

l~~M day of October, 1983.
Respectfully submitted,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By

ByB~~
Attorneys for Respondents
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APPENDIX
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The Honorable J. Harlan Burns
District Judge
Fifth Judicial District Court
220 North 200 East
St. Georae, Utah 84770
!l.e:

Timothy Leona re \'lood, et al. v. Winston Stratton, et ..
Civil No.
8594, Washington County

Dear Judge Burns:
Enclosed please find the Su=ary Judg;:ient which •:e ha\'e
prepared in the above-capitioned matter, pursuant to your
directions.
A copy has been submitted to Mr. Scarth pursuant
to Rule 2.9.
l'Je would appreciate it if the Clerk's office ;:cc::
notify us as to the date the SlIBl.-:iary Judgment is entered; a se'.'addressec postcard is enclosed for that purpose.
We appreciate your cooperation in this matter.
Very truly yours,
SNOW, CH'1.ISTENSSN

& M.ARTI'\'.:;:·

~~]).JLt. it.~
Bruce

Hf J n sen

BHJ:pw
Enclosure

cc:

Jim R. Scarth, Esq.

APPLNDIX

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
hereby certify that I mailed two (2) true and correct

cories of the foregoing Brief of Respondent, postage pre-paid
to:

Jim R. Scarth
Attorney for Appellant
724 East St. George Boulevard
P.O. Box 577
St. George, Utah 84770
On the

/ 3 t/J

day of October, 1983.

